How do I revise Metaphysics of Mind for AQA Education A-Level?

Clearly distinguish between different problems of consciousness.

What exam tips are there for Metaphysics of Mind? (2)

Use thought experiments to illustrate qualia.

What exam tips are there for Metaphysics of Mind? (3)

Critically assess each theory's explanatory power.

What mistakes should I avoid in Metaphysics of Mind?

Confusing the hard problem with easy problems.

What are common errors in Metaphysics of Mind exams? (2)

Misunderstanding qualia as merely subjective experience.

Metaphysics of Mind

AQA-EDUCATION

A-Level

This topic examines the hard problem of consciousness, qualia, and major theories of consciousness. Learners will critically evaluate different philosophical perspectives.

Objectives

Exam Tips

Pitfalls

Key Terms

Mark Points

Subtopics in this area

Metaphysics of Mind

Topic Overview

The Metaphysics of Mind is a core component of the AQA A-Level Philosophy syllabus, exploring the fundamental nature of mental phenomena and their relationship to the physical world. This topic addresses questions such as: What is the mind? Is it distinct from the brain? How do mental states cause physical actions? Students engage with key philosophical positions including substance dualism, property dualism, and various forms of physicalism (e.g., type identity theory, functionalism). Understanding these debates is crucial for grasping broader philosophical issues about consciousness, personal identity, and free will.

This topic matters because it challenges students to critically evaluate competing explanations of the mind-body problem, a central issue in philosophy. By examining arguments from thinkers like Descartes (substance dualism), Ryle (logical behaviourism), and Putnam (functionalism), students develop analytical skills applicable to other areas of philosophy and cognitive science. The Metaphysics of Mind also connects to ethical debates about AI consciousness and the nature of personal identity, making it highly relevant to contemporary issues.

Within the AQA specification, this topic is studied alongside Epistemology and Moral Philosophy, but it stands out for its focus on the ontology of mind. Students must be able to articulate and critique arguments such as the conceivability argument, the knowledge argument, and the problem of mental causation. Mastery of this topic requires careful attention to the distinctions between different types of dualism and physicalism, as well as an understanding of how these positions respond to objections.

What You Need to Demonstrate

Key skills and knowledge for this topic

Explain the hard problem of consciousness.
Define qualia and give examples.
Compare and contrast theories of consciousness.
Evaluate strengths and weaknesses of each theory.
Award credit for accurately explaining type identity theory as the view that mental state types (e.g., pain) are identical to specific brain state types (e.g., C-fibre firing), referencing key proponents like Smart and Place.
Award credit for clearly detailing functionalism, including the causal role specification of mental states and the argument from multiple realizability against type identity theory, with reference to Putnam.
Award credit for demonstrating critical evaluation of physicalism by applying standard objections such as the knowledge argument (Mary's room), the explanatory gap, the hard problem of consciousness, or issues of qualia, and linking these to the limitations of physicalist explanations.
Award credit for effectively comparing the relative strengths and weaknesses of type identity theory and functionalism, including the ability to handle multiple realizability and the problem of defining causal roles precisely.

Marking Points

Key points examiners look for in your answers

Explain the hard problem of consciousness.
Define qualia and give examples.
Compare and contrast theories of consciousness.
Evaluate strengths and weaknesses of each theory.
Award credit for accurately explaining type identity theory as the view that mental state types (e.g., pain) are identical to specific brain state types (e.g., C-fibre firing), referencing key proponents like Smart and Place.
Award credit for clearly detailing functionalism, including the causal role specification of mental states and the argument from multiple realizability against type identity theory, with reference to Putnam.
Award credit for demonstrating critical evaluation of physicalism by applying standard objections such as the knowledge argument (Mary's room), the explanatory gap, the hard problem of consciousness, or issues of qualia, and linking these to the limitations of physicalist explanations.
Award credit for effectively comparing the relative strengths and weaknesses of type identity theory and functionalism, including the ability to handle multiple realizability and the problem of defining causal roles precisely.
Award credit for clearly defining substance dualism and distinguishing it from property dualism.
Award credit for accurately outlining Descartes' conceivability argument and its role in supporting substance dualism.
Award credit for explaining the key features of property dualism, including the idea that mental properties are non-reducible to physical properties.
Award credit for evaluating dualism by presenting at least one strong objection (e.g., the interaction problem) and a counter-response.

Examiner Tips

Expert advice for maximising your marks

💡Clearly distinguish between different problems of consciousness.
💡Use thought experiments to illustrate qualia.
💡Critically assess each theory's explanatory power.
💡Use precise philosophical terminology: distinguish clearly between type and token identity, and between analytic and empirical reduction. Reference specific philosophers and texts, e.g., Smart's 'Sensations and Brain Processes'.
💡Structure essays with a coherent line of argument: present physicalist theories (AO1), then evaluate them using well-chosen objections (AO2), ensuring that evaluation is sustained throughout rather than confined to a final paragraph.
💡When presenting functionalism, contrast it explicitly with both type identity theory and dualism, and highlight how functionalism attempts to solve the multiple realizability problem while facing its own difficulties with absent qualia and the inverted spectrum.
💡To achieve top marks, engage with the meta-philosophical question of whether the hard problem of consciousness constitutes a decisive objection to physicalism, or whether physicalists can legitimately reject the intuition that there is an explanatory gap.
💡Always begin by defining key terms such as 'substance', 'property', 'dualism', and 'reduction' to establish a clear conceptual framework.
💡Use the 'PEEL' structure (Point, Evidence, Explanation, Link) in paragraphs, ensuring each evaluation point is supported by specific references to philosophers like Descartes or Chalmers.
💡When evaluating, ensure you present a balanced discussion, considering both strengths and weaknesses of dualism, rather than a one-sided critique.
💡Cite relevant thought experiments (e.g., the zombie argument for property dualism) to demonstrate depth of understanding.

Common Mistakes

Pitfalls to avoid in your exam answers

Confusing the hard problem with easy problems.
Misunderstanding qualia as merely subjective experience.
Failing to support evaluation with reasoning.
Confusing type identity theory with token identity theory, often implying that every mental token is identical to a physical token without specifying type-type identity, thereby misrepresenting Smart's claim.
Mischaracterizing functionalism as a form of behaviorism by ignoring that functionalism posits internal states with causal roles, while behaviorism reduces mental states to dispositions to behave.
Neglecting the multiple realizability objection when evaluating type identity theory, leading to a superficial critique that overlooks the force of Putnam's argument from species variation and neural plasticity.
Providing evaluations that merely list objections without analysing their strength or considering physicalist responses, such as the phenomenal concept strategy or a priori physicalism.
Students often conflate substance dualism with property dualism, treating them as interchangeable when they are distinct theories.
When explaining Descartes' argument, a common error is to oversimplify the conceivability argument, omitting the principle that clear and distinct conception entails possibility.
Many students describe the interaction problem without linking it precisely to dualism's metaphysical commitments, failing to show why it is a problem specifically for substance dualism.
In evaluating dualism, students sometimes rely on intuitive rather than philosophical arguments, neglecting to engage with the academic literature or counter-arguments.

Frequently Asked Questions

Common questions students ask about this topic

Key Terminology

Essential terms to know

Qualia

Phenomenal consciousness

Access consciousness

Hard problem

Type identity theory

Token identity theory

Functionalism

Multiple realizability

Cartesian dualism

Interaction problem

Property dualism

Epiphenomenalism

Likely Command Words

How questions on this topic are typically asked

Explain

Define

Compare

Evaluate

Ready to test yourself?

Practice questions tailored to this topic

Metaphysics of Mind

Subtopics in this area

Topic Overview

What You Need to Demonstrate

Marking Points

Examiner Tips

Common Mistakes

Frequently Asked Questions

Key Terminology

Likely Command Words

Ready to test yourself?

Related Topics in AQA-EDUCATION A-Level Philosophy

Metaphysics of God

Moral Philosophy

Moral Philosophy

Moral Philosophy

Metaphysics of Mind

Subtopics in this area

Topic Overview

What You Need to Demonstrate

Marking Points

Examiner Tips

Common Mistakes

Frequently Asked Questions

What is the difference between substance dualism and property dualism?

How does functionalism solve the problem of mental causation?

What is the knowledge argument against physicalism?

Why is mental causation a problem for dualism?

What is the difference between type identity theory and functionalism?

How does Ryle's behaviourism critique substance dualism?

Key Terminology

Likely Command Words

Ready to test yourself?

Related Topics in AQA-EDUCATION A-Level Philosophy

Metaphysics of God

Moral Philosophy

Moral Philosophy

Moral Philosophy