Metaphysics of mind: Set texts — AQA A-Level Philosophy

The set texts for the Metaphysics of Mind in AQA A-Level Philosophy comprise primary philosophical writings from seminal thinkers including Descartes, Ryle, J.J.C. Smart, Frank Jackson, and David Chalmers. These texts provide the authoritative formulation of foundational positions: substance dualism, logical behaviourism, mind-brain type identity theory, epiphenomenalism, and property dualism.

Mastery of these set texts requires students not merely to understand general positions, but to analyse the precise mechanical deductions, technical definitions, and thought experiments drafted by the authors. A deep familiarity with these original arguments allows students to achieve high-band marks in 5, 9, and 25-mark evaluation questions.

• →Descartes' Meditations (II and VI): The Cogito, the Divisibility Argument, and the Conceivability Argument establishing substance dualism via the Indiscernibility of Identicals.
• →Ryle's Concept of Mind ('Descartes' Myth'): The critique of the 'Ghost in the Machine' as an ontological category mistake and the establishment of dispositional behaviourism.
• →Smart's Sensations and Brain Processes: The defence of ontological identity between sensations and neurophysiological processes via Occam's Razor, avoiding 'nomological danglers'.
• →Jackson's Epiphenomenal Qualia: The Knowledge Argument (Mary's Room) proving phenomenal properties (qualia) cannot be reduced to physical facts.
• →Chalmers' The Conscious Mind: The Hard Problem of Consciousness and the Zombie Argument establishing property dualism via metaphysical possibility.

• Accurately reconstructs Churchland's claim that folk psychology is a proto-theory vulnerable to replacement by a mature neuroscience, rather than merely to smooth reduction.
• Explains the distinction between elimination and reduction, showing why she thinks mental-state terms might be discarded rather than translated into neural terms.
• Uses the neuroscientific material in the set sections to show how a psychological capacity can be illuminated by brain-level explanation.
• Evaluates the position, for example by asking whether first-person experience could be eliminated or whether the historical analogy with past theoretical posits is strong enough.
• Distinguishes Churchland's eliminativism from identity theory and from property dualism, avoiding conflation of rival positions.
• Supports claims with located references to the Introduction sections and Chapter 4, section 2, and separates reported views from the author's own.
• Accurately reconstructs Churchland's eliminativist claim that folk psychology is an empirical theory that may be radically false and so eliminated rather than reduced.
• Explains at least two of his section 2 lines of evidence, such as the stagnation of folk psychology, its explanatory failures, or its lack of integration with the physical sciences.
• Uses the historical analogy with discarded theoretical posits (for example caloric or phlogiston) and explains how the analogy is meant to support elimination.
• Evaluates the argument, for instance by questioning whether predictive success of folk psychology counts against elimination, or whether the analogy to superseded physics is apt.
• Considers a serious objection or rival position, such as the reply that propositional attitudes can be vindicated by cognitive science, and responds to it.
• Reaches a supported judgement about how far section 2 establishes that folk psychology might really be false.
• Reconstructs Descartes' real distinction argument: mind and body are conceived as distinct, what is conceived apart can be separated, therefore they are really distinct substances.
• Explains the role of clear and distinct perception and God's non-deceiving nature in securing the move from conceivability to real distinction.
• Explains Descartes' account of mind–body union, including how sensation and feeling belong to the composite rather than to mind alone.
• Evaluates the conceivability premise, for example by questioning whether conceiving mind without body establishes genuine separability.
• Addresses the interaction problem and assesses Descartes' response that the union explains sensation and embodiment.
• Reaches a supported judgement on how far Meditation 6 establishes substance dualism.
• Reconstructs Hempel's aim of logically analysing psychological statements into the language of physics.
• Explains that the reduction is claimed to preserve meaning, so mental vocabulary becomes dispensable shorthand.
• Illustrates the proposed translation with a mental sentence and a physical paraphrase of bodily states and movements.
• Assesses the programme by testing whether the physical paraphrase preserves the meaning of the original mental statement.
• Uses the set text as evidence for the reconstruction rather than merely naming Hempel.
• Reaches a supported judgement on whether hard behaviourism's reduction succeeds or fails.
• Reconstructs the knowledge argument: Mary knows all physical facts about colour vision but learns something new on release, so not all facts are physical.
• Explains the role of qualia as intrinsic, subjective features of experience that the argument claims physicalism omits.
• Explains Jackson's epiphenomenalist conclusion: qualia are non-physical and causally inert with respect to physical events.
• Evaluates the ability hypothesis response, that Mary gains know-how rather than new propositional knowledge.
• Evaluates the acquaintance or phenomenal-concept response, that Mary gains a new way of representing old facts.
• Considers the significance of Jackson's later rejection of the argument while assessing the 1982 version on its merits.
• Accurately reconstructs Putnam's target: the identity theory's claim that mental state types are identical with physical (brain) state types.
• Explains multiple realisability: the same mental state could be realised in physically different systems, so a type-identity between mental and physical states fails.
• Explains Putnam's positive proposal that mental states are functional states characterised by causal role rather than by material constitution.
• Uses the text as evidence for a position and evaluates it, for example by considering whether functionalism leaves out phenomenal character or qualia.
• Distinguishes Putnam's functionalism from behaviourism and from the identity theory, showing what is gained and what is lost.
• Explains Ryle's target, Cartesian dualism, as the doctrine of a ghostly inner substance distinct from the body.
• Explains the category mistake: mental terms are misread as naming a hidden entity rather than describing capacities and dispositions.
• Explains Ryle's dispositional account, where mental concepts describe how someone is disposed to act across circumstances.
• Distinguishes Ryle's view from crude behaviourism, recognising that dispositions are not the same as actual observable movements.
• Evaluates the account, for example by asking whether it can accommodate consciousness, sensation and the first-person character of experience.
• Locates the source accurately: Shapiro's 2007 University of Chicago Press edition and translation of the Elisabeth–Descartes correspondence, with attention to the May 1643 letters.
• Reconstructs Elisabeth's objection: if the mind is immaterial and unextended, it is unclear how it can initiate motion in an extended body, so the interaction needs explanation.
• Explains Descartes's response: he appeals to the experienced union of mind and body and to a primitive notion of their interaction that cannot be reduced to the notions of body or of mind alone.
• Assesses the strength of the reply: considers whether invoking the union explains interaction or simply labels the phenomenon, and whether Elisabeth's demand for a causal account is met.
• Connects the exchange to the broader dualist problem of mind–body interaction and to the challenge it poses for substance dualism.
• Reaches a reasoned judgement about how far the May 1643 correspondence resolves or exposes the interaction difficulty.

• 💡Read Chapter 2 with a question in mind: how does Avramides frame the inference to other minds?
• 💡Summarise her argument and the positions she examines in your own words, with page references.
• 💡Link the chapter's distinctions back to the other-minds arguments in the specification to deepen evaluation.
• 💡Read sections 1–2 twice: first for the overall shape of the argument, then with a pen to mark definitions, distinctions and the first signs of objection.
• 💡Make a one-page argument map with page references so you can locate claims quickly when planning an essay under timed conditions.
• 💡Practise stating Block's position in your own words in two or three sentences, then check it against the text to catch distortion.
• 💡Read Chapter 1 once straight through for the shape of the argument, then again marking definitions, distinctions and the central problem.
• 💡Write a short summary of the chapter's argument in numbered steps with page references, and test whether each step follows from the last.
• 💡Prepare two or three sentences explaining the central problem in your own words, then check them against the text for accuracy.
• 💡Make a two-question grid (reducible? fundamental?) and place each position in it, so you can compare views quickly under time pressure.
• 💡Annotate each position with one strength and one objection in your own words, ready to deploy in an essay.
• 💡Record section and page references as you read so any point you make can be located accurately.
• 💡Open with a precise statement of her thesis, then structure the essay as reconstruction followed by evaluation.
• 💡Anchor each evaluative point to a specific claim in the set sections rather than to general remarks about materialism.
• 💡Use the elimination-versus-reduction distinction as a recurring thread to keep the argument focused.
• 💡Anchor each paragraph in a specific claim from section 2 rather than general remarks about eliminativism.
• 💡When using the analogy, state explicitly what feature is being compared and why it matters.
• 💡Build an evaluative conclusion that weighs the evidence rather than merely listing objections.
• 💡State the premises of the real distinction argument explicitly before evaluating them.
• 💡Distinguish clearly between the conceivability claim and the separability claim when criticising.
• 💡Use the union and interaction material to show the argument's wider commitments, not just its conclusion.
• 💡Open by stating Hempel's reductionist thesis precisely, then structure the response around reconstruction followed by evaluation.
• 💡Anchor evaluation in the meaning-preservation test with a concrete mental sentence and its proposed physical paraphrase.
• 💡Reach an explicit judgement rather than listing objections without deciding whether the reduction succeeds.
• 💡Set out the knowledge argument as numbered premises leading to the conclusion before evaluating it.
• 💡Name each physicalist response precisely and show exactly which premise it challenges.
• 💡Use Jackson's later change of mind as supporting evaluation, not as a substitute for analysing the argument.
• 💡State the conclusion of the multiple realisability argument before unpacking its premises, so the examiner sees the structure.
• 💡Illustrate with a concrete case, such as pain realised differently in an octopus and a human, to show you understand the argument rather than reciting it.
• 💡Evaluate as well as explain: consider an objection such as the possibility of a system with the right functional organisation but no experience, and respond to it.
• 💡Explain the category mistake with a clear example before applying it to dualism, so the argument is transparent.
• 💡Show how Ryle's dispositional account handles a specific mental concept, such as believing or wanting, to demonstrate understanding.
• 💡Evaluate by weighing the strength of the anti-dualist critique against objections about consciousness and inner experience.
• 💡Anchor points in the May 1643 letters and name who says what, distinguishing Elisabeth's objection from Descartes's reply.
• 💡Explain the primitive notion of union carefully before judging whether it answers the interaction problem.
• 💡End with an explicit evaluation of whether the correspondence resolves the difficulty for dualism.
• 💡Read with a pen: mark Smart's central identity claim, his topic-neutral analysis and each objection he answers.
• 💡Write a one-line summary of each stage of the argument so you can reconstruct its structure without the text.
• 💡Note where Smart relies on analogy or scientific discovery, since that is where evaluation is most productive.
• 💡Always quote or closely paraphrase key phrases from the set texts, such as Smart's 'nomological dangler' or Ryle's 'category mistake', as examiners use these to spot high-calibre script responses.
• 💡Structure your evaluation of set texts by clearly stating whether an objection attacks the validity of the logical form or the truth of a specific premise (e.g. attacking Chalmers' move from conceivability to metaphysical possibility).

• Treating the bibliographic entry as a fact to memorise for the exam: correct this by using it as a reading pointer to the argument in Chapter 2.
• Reading the chapter without noting Avramides's own position versus the views she reports: distinguish her argument from the positions she surveys.
• Ignoring page references: record them so claims can be located and checked accurately.
• Assuming the chapter settles the debate: use it to understand and evaluate the problem, not as a final verdict.
• Treating the set text as a list of conclusions to quote rather than an argument to reconstruct. Correction: identify Block's premises, the view he is targeting and the step where the objection bites, citing the pages you read.
• Assuming the whole essay is covered. Correction: this row specifies sections 1–2 only, so keep your notes and any references inside those pages and do not attribute later material to this reading.
• Confusing a description of functionalism with an argument for it. Correction: separate passages where Block explains the theory from passages where he evaluates or challenges it.
• Using technical vocabulary loosely, for example calling any causal account 'functionalism' without checking how Block defines it in these sections. Correction: quote or paraphrase his own definition and keep your usage consistent with it.
• Reducing the chapter to a single label such as 'the hard problem' without explaining the argument that gives it content. Correction: reconstruct the steps Chalmers takes to set up the difficulty and cite the pages.
• Treating Chalmers's conclusions as established fact rather than as a philosophical position to be assessed. Correction: distinguish his claims from the arguments he offers for them and note where critics could press.
• Importing material from later chapters or other books as if it were in Chapter 1. Correction: keep notes and references within the set chapter and mark clearly anything you add from elsewhere.
• Confusing a definition or distinction with an argument. Correction: label each note as definition, distinction, objection or argument so your essay planning stays accurate.
• Treating the chapter as a single argued conclusion rather than a survey that classifies rival positions; correct this by separating Chalmers's own preferred view from his neutral description of alternatives.
• Collapsing the hard problem into the easy problems by assuming that explaining cognitive functions would explain experience; correct this by stating precisely what the hard problem adds.
• Reading the taxonomy as an official exam list of named positions to memorise; correct this by using it as a conceptual map you can apply and criticise in your own words.
• Attributing a quoted or reported claim to Chalmers himself when he is summarising another philosopher; correct this by naming the speaker or view being reported.
• Confusing eliminative materialism with identity theory; correct this by stressing that elimination discards the vocabulary whereas identity theory retains and identifies it.
• Assuming Churchland denies that experience occurs; correct this by explaining that her target is the explanatory adequacy of folk-psychological categories, not the existence of experience as such.
• Presenting her neuroscientific examples as proof of eliminativism rather than as evidence for the explanatory power of a brain-based approach; correct this by calibrating the strength of the evidential claim.
• Attributing a reported view to Churchland when she is summarising another theorist; correct this by naming the speaker or position being reported.
• Treating eliminative materialism as the claim that minds do not exist at all; correct this by explaining it targets propositional attitudes specifically, not consciousness or experience wholesale.
• Presenting the caloric or phlogiston comparison as proof rather than analogy; correct this by explaining it is an illustrative parallel whose force must itself be assessed.
• Assuming Churchland claims folk psychology has already been shown false; correct this by stressing his modal 'might be false' framing and the fallibilist structure of the argument.
• Treating the real distinction as resting on an empirical observation of two things; correct this by showing it rests on a priori conceivability plus divine guarantee.
• Confusing the real distinction argument with the cogito; correct this by separating the earlier certainty of thinking from the later argument for distinct substances.
• Ignoring the interaction discussion; correct this by explaining that Descartes must account for how an immaterial mind affects an extended body.
• Summarising Hempel's view as the claim that minds cause behaviour; correction: it is a semantic thesis that mental propositions reduce to physical ones.
• Treating the reduction as merely a useful convention with no claim about meaning; correction: Hempel's programme asserts meaning-preservation, which is what must be assessed.
• Naming Hempel without engaging the argument; correction: use the text to reconstruct the reduction and then evaluate it.
• Describing Mary as gaining new physical information; correct this by stressing she already knows all physical facts and allegedly gains non-physical knowledge.
• Treating epiphenomenalism as the same as substance dualism; correct by explaining that qualia are claimed to be non-physical properties that do not cause physical events.
• Presenting the ability hypothesis as a refutation without explaining how it accounts for Mary's new knowledge; correct by spelling out the know-how versus propositional-knowledge distinction.
• Treating Putnam as defending the identity theory: correct this by showing his argument is directed against type-identity and towards functionalism.
• Confusing multiple realisability with the claim that minds are non-physical: correct this by explaining it concerns the relation between mental and physical state types, not dualism.
• Presenting functionalism as simply 'the mind is a computer': correct this by explaining causal role and the input–state–output structure.
• Inventing direct quotations from the essay: correct this by paraphrasing the argument and only quoting wording you can verify.
• Describing Ryle as denying that minds exist at all: correct this by explaining he rejects a mistaken picture of mind, not mentality itself.
• Equating Ryle's dispositionalism with behaviourism that ignores inner states: correct this by explaining dispositions are real capacities, not mere movements.
• Failing to explain the category mistake concretely: correct this by giving an illustration of looking for the mind as a further thing behind behaviour.
• Inventing quotations from the chapters: correct this by paraphrasing the argument and only quoting wording you can verify.
• Attributing the interaction objection to Descartes: the correction is that Elisabeth raises the difficulty and Descartes responds to it.
• Treating the primitive notion of union as a full causal explanation: the correction is to assess whether it explains interaction or merely describes the experienced unity.
• Ignoring the specified edition and date range: the correction is to ground discussion in Shapiro's 2007 translation of the May 1643 letters rather than later or unsourced material.
• Reading only summaries instead of the article: the correction is to work through Smart's own argument and examples so you can discuss his reasoning accurately.
• Confusing identity with correlation: the correction is to see that Smart claims sensations are brain processes, not merely that they accompany them.
• Ignoring the topic-neutral move: the correction is to notice how Smart redescribes sensation language to avoid begging the question against dualism.
• Thinking Smart argues that the words 'pain' and 'c-fibres firing' mean the same thing: Smart explicitly defends contingent ontological reduction, not analytic or synonymy claims (like 'morning star' and 'evening star').
• Confusing conceivability with physical possibility in Chalmers' Zombie Argument: Chalmers does not claim zombies could exist under our current laws of physics, but that they are possible across alternative possible worlds with different psychophysical laws.

1. 1Day 1-2: Reconstruct Descartes' Conceivability and Divisibility arguments into standard premise-conclusion form; map common responses.
2. 2Day 3-4: Study Ryle's university analogy and behaviourist dispositional analysis; compare with Smart's 'Sensations and Brain Processes'.
3. 3Day 5-6: Analyse Jackson's Mary argument and the main physicalist replies (Ability Hypothesis, Acquaintance Hypothesis, New Knowledge / Old Fact).
4. 4Day 7-8: Compare Chalmers' Zombie argument with Jackson's knowledge argument; write timed 9-mark and 25-mark practice essays.

• 📋3-mark definitions: Defining technical terms directly originating in set texts (e.g. 'Define qualia', 'Define category mistake').
• 📋5-mark exposition questions: Setting out an argument from a set text in standard premise-conclusion form without evaluation.
• 📋9-mark comparison or objection questions: Explaining a set text argument and setting out an official counter-argument in full detail.
• 📋25-mark evaluative essays: Assessing the overall success of a position (e.g. 'Is property dualism successful?'), requiring heavy synthesis of set texts.