What do we mean by ‘mind’? — AQA A-Level Philosophy
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What do we mean by ‘mind’? explained
What do we mean by ‘mind’? covers 3 specification points, including All or at least some mental states have… and Some, but not all, philosophers use the term….
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Open a point below for its explanation and revision guidance.
Features of mental states: All or at least some mental states have phenomenal properties
This point asks you to characterise mental states by what they are like to undergo. A phenomenal property is the subjective, felt character of an experience: what it is like for the subject to be in that state. The statement makes a disjunctive claim, so distinguish two readings. The strong reading says all mental states have phenomenal properties, so every belief, hope or calculation carries a felt quality. The weaker reading says at least some do, for example the sting of pain, the taste of coffee or the redness of a visual experience, while allowing that other states such as abstract reasoning may lack any distinctive feel. To assess the claim, test candidate states against the question 'is there something it is like to be in this state?' and consider whether the felt character is present in every case or only in some.
Some, but not all, philosophers use the term 'qualia' to refer to these properties, where 'qualia' are defined as 'intrinsic and non-intentional phenomenal properties that are introspectively accessible'
This point concerns terminology rather than a settled doctrine. Some philosophers call the phenomenal properties of experience 'qualia', but not all do, so the term is contested and you should not assume every philosopher accepts it. Where it is used, qualia are defined by three features. They are intrinsic: they belong to the experience itself rather than depending on relations to other things. They are non-intentional: they are not about anything, unlike a belief that represents the world. And they are introspectively accessible: the subject can attend to them from the first-person perspective. A useful test is to ask whether a feature of experience is felt, not about anything, and available to introspection. Recognise also that philosophers who reject the notion of qualia may still accept that experiences have phenomenal character.
All or at least some mental states have intentional properties (ie intentionality).
Intentionality is the property of being about something, of representing or pointing beyond itself. A belief that it will rain is about the weather; a hope is about a hoped-for outcome; a fear is about a feared object. The statement makes a claim about how far this feature extends: either every mental state has intentional properties, or only some do. Learners should be able to unpack 'intentional properties' as directedness or aboutness, distinguish it from intending to act, and test the two readings. Pains and sudden sensations are often offered as candidate counterexamples to the universal reading, while beliefs, desires and perceptions are clear cases. The task is to identify which option correctly captures the claim and its scope.
Your focus
- Explain what a phenomenal property is and illustrate it with an example.
- Distinguish the claim that all mental states have phenomenal properties from the claim that at least some do.
- Evaluate whether a given mental state possesses phenomenal character.
Show all 9 objectives
- State the three features in the definition of qualia.
- Explain why the term 'qualia' is used by some but not all philosophers.
- Distinguish qualia from intentional mental states.
- Define intentionality as the property of mental states being about or directed at something.
- Explain the difference between the claim that all mental states are intentional and the claim that only some are.
- Apply the concept to examples such as beliefs, desires and sensations to judge which states are intentional.
What do we mean by ‘mind’? exam tips
Marking Points
- Defines a phenomenal property as the subjective felt character of an experience, i.e. what it is like to be in that state.
- Distinguishes the strong reading (all mental states have phenomenal properties) from the weaker reading (at least some do).
- Gives a clear example of a state with phenomenal character, such as pain or the taste of coffee.
- Recognises that the weaker reading permits some mental states, such as abstract thought, to lack a distinctive felt quality.
- Applies the test of whether there is something it is like to be in the state rather than merely describing behaviour.
- Notes that the term 'qualia' is used by some but not all philosophers, so its use is contested.
- Defines qualia as intrinsic phenomenal properties, belonging to the experience itself rather than to relations.
- Defines qualia as non-intentional, i.e. not representing or being about anything.
- Defines qualia as introspectively accessible, available to the subject's first-person awareness.
- Distinguishes accepting phenomenal character from accepting the specific terminology of qualia.
- Correctly identifies intentionality as the aboutness or directedness of mental states, the property of being about or representing something.
- Recognises that the statement offers two possible scopes: all mental states, or at least some mental states, have intentional properties.
- Distinguishes intentionality (aboutness) from intending to do something, which is a different everyday use of 'intention'.
- Gives a clear example of an intentional state, such as a belief that it will rain being about the weather.
- Recognises that states such as a sudden pain may be offered as candidates lacking aboutness, which bears on whether all or only some mental states are intentional.
Examiner Tips
- 💡Read the whole statement, including 'or at least some', before choosing an option; the disjunction changes which answers are defensible.
- 💡Use a concrete example such as pain or colour experience to test each option against the 'what it is like' question.
- 💡Eliminate options that describe behaviour or brain activity rather than subjective felt character.
- 💡Check each option against all three defining features: intrinsic, non-intentional and introspectively accessible.
- 💡Watch for options that treat 'qualia' as universally accepted terminology; the statement explicitly limits its use to some philosophers.
- 💡Separate the claim that experiences have phenomenal character from the claim that these are best called qualia.
- 💡Underline the phrase 'intentional properties' and translate it immediately into 'aboutness' before choosing an option.
- 💡Check the scope words 'all' and 'at least some' against each option, since the statement deliberately leaves the extent open.
- 💡Test each option with a quick example, such as a belief about the weather, to see whether it matches the definition.
- 💡Eliminate options that confuse intentionality with intending to act, as this is the most common distractor.
Common Mistakes
- Treating phenomenal properties as physical properties of the brain: correct this by stressing that they are the felt, subjective character of experience.
- Assuming the statement claims all mental states are phenomenal: correct this by noting the 'or at least some' disjunction and the weaker reading it allows.
- Confusing phenomenal character with intentional content (what a state is about): correct this by separating what an experience feels like from what it represents.
- Assuming all philosophers use 'qualia' as a technical term: correct this by noting the statement says some but not all do.
- Treating qualia as intentional states that represent objects: correct this by stressing that qualia are defined as non-intentional.
- Confusing intrinsic with relational: correct this by explaining that intrinsic properties belong to the experience itself, not to its relations.
- Confusing intentionality with deliberately intending to perform an action; correction: intentionality here means aboutness or directedness, not having a plan.
- Assuming the statement claims that all mental states are intentional without noticing the 'or at least some' alternative; correction: the statement allows either the universal or the partial reading.
- Treating intentionality as a physical property of the brain; correction: it is a property of mental states concerning what they represent or are directed at.
- Thinking an example of a thought is enough without saying what it is about; correction: always specify the object the state is directed towards.