Philosophy of religion: Evil and suffering — AQA A-Level Religious Studies
Philosophy of religion: Evil and suffering explained
Philosophy of religion: Evil and suffering covers 8 specification points, including The problem of evil and suffering.
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and The concepts of natural and moral evil.. Open a point below for its explanation and revision guidance.
The problem of evil and suffering.
The problem of evil and suffering asks how the existence of evil and suffering can be reconciled with belief in God. The logical problem claims that an all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good God cannot coexist with evil, so the combination is contradictory. The evidential problem claims that the amount and distribution of suffering make belief in such a God improbable rather than impossible. Responses include theodicies, which attempt to justify God's permission of evil, and defences, which aim only to show that the combination is not logically contradictory. Distinguish moral evil, caused by free agents, from natural evil, arising from natural processes, and note that 'suffering' names the experienced harm.
The concepts of natural and moral evil.
This topic asks you to distinguish two categories of evil used throughout the problem of evil. Natural evil covers suffering caused by impersonal features of the world: earthquakes, disease, drought, animal predation. Moral evil covers suffering caused by free human choices: murder, torture, theft, neglect. The distinction matters because defences such as the free will defence address moral evil directly but must say something extra about natural evil, while a soul-making theodicy may treat both as opportunities for growth. A strong answer defines each concept, gives a clear example of each, and explains why the boundary can be contested, for example where human negligence worsens a flood. Learn to classify examples accurately and to state the criterion you are using.
The logical and evidential problem of evil.
This topic requires you to separate two forms of the problem of evil. The logical problem argues that the existence of any evil is logically incompatible with an omnipotent, omniscient and omnibenevolent God, so the set of beliefs is inconsistent. The evidential problem, associated with William Rowe, concedes logical consistency but argues that the amount, intensity and distribution of suffering, especially apparently pointless suffering, makes belief in such a God improbable rather than impossible. Learn to state each premise clearly, identify what each form must show, and explain why a response that defeats the logical problem, such as the free will defence, may not answer the evidential problem. Distinguish deductive inconsistency from probabilistic support.
Responses to the problem of evil and suffering.
The problem of evil and suffering asks how a good, all-powerful and all-knowing God can coexist with evil. A response must be classified correctly. A defence limits what God could permit while keeping his attributes intact; a theodicy offers a positive reason why God allows evil. Learners should distinguish logical from evidential forms of the problem, then match each response to the form it answers. Augustinian type responses locate evil in the misuse of free will by created beings and treat evil as a privation of good. Irenaean type responses treat evil as a necessary environment for developing moral and spiritual maturity. Process and free-will defences relocate or limit divine power. Each response carries costs: the Augustinian appeal to a fall and to universal guilt, and the Irenaean appeal to an epistemic distance and to a possible universal salvation.
Hick’s soul making theodicy.
Hick develops an Irenaean type theodicy in which the world is a vale of soul-making rather than a hedonistic paradise. God creates beings at an epistemic distance, so that free, uncoerced faith and moral growth are possible. Suffering supplies the challenges through which persons move from an immature image of God toward a developed likeness of God. Hick distinguishes this world as a person-making environment from a pleasure-maximising one, and he argues that a world without danger and pain could not produce courage, compassion or perseverance. He extends the theodicy with universal salvation, so that no person's development is finally wasted.
The free will defence.
The free will defence argues that a good, omnipotent God may permit evil because a world containing genuinely free creatures is better than one without, and free creatures can choose wrongly. It is a defence, not a full theodicy: it aims to show that God and evil are logically compatible, answering the logical problem of evil. Key moves: freedom requires the real possibility of moral evil; natural evil may be linked to a stable world of law or to the actions of free non-human beings; the value of freedom outweighs the cost. Learners should distinguish it from the free will theodicy, note the distinction between moral and natural evil, and evaluate objections such as the compatibility of freedom with divine foreknowledge and the proportionality of suffering.
Process theodicy as presented by Griffin.
Process theodicy, as presented by David Ray Griffin, draws on Whitehead's process philosophy. God is not omnipotent in the classical sense but is a persuasive, relational influence within the world, sharing in its becoming. Evil arises from the freedom and spontaneity of entities and from the way the world evolves; God cannot unilaterally prevent it but works to bring good out of it. Griffin argues this makes God genuinely good and involved in suffering rather than its arbitrary author. Learners should explain the rejection of classical omnipotence, the persuasive rather than coercive power of God, and evaluate whether this adequately answers the problem of evil or merely redefines God.
The strengths and weaknesses of each response.
This criterion asks you to weigh the responses to evil and suffering that the specification names: the free will defence, Hick's soul-making theodicy and Griffin's process theodicy. For each one, set out what it claims about God, freedom and the origin and purpose of suffering, then judge how well it answers the problem it addresses. Take the free will defence: it argues that genuine freedom, and so a world with real moral goods, requires the possibility of moral evil, and you assess whether that justifies natural suffering as well as moral evil. With Hick, examine the claim that the world is a soul-making environment and test whether the distribution and intensity of suffering fit that purpose. With Griffin, consider whether a God who persuades rather than coerces can be reconciled with the scale of suffering. Reach a reasoned judgement rather than a list.
Your focus
- Distinguish the logical problem of evil from the evidential problem.
- Define moral evil and natural evil with examples.
- Explain the difference between a theodicy and a defence.
Show all 24 objectives
- Distinguish natural evil from moral evil with accurate definitions.
- Classify given examples of suffering using a stated criterion.
- Explain why the distinction is significant for responses to the problem of evil.
- Distinguish the logical problem of evil from the evidential problem of evil.
- State the structure and key claim of each version accurately.
- Explain why a response to one version may not answer the other.
- Classify a given response as a defence or a theodicy and justify the classification.
- Distinguish the logical problem from the evidential problem and match responses to each.
- Evaluate a response by testing whether it removes the contradiction and whether its costs are acceptable.
- Explain Hick's soul-making theodicy using its key terms accurately.
- Distinguish the image of God from the likeness of God and explain how suffering contributes to the latter.
- Evaluate the theodicy against the scale and distribution of suffering and against the doctrine of universal salvation.
- Explain the structure of the free will defence and its aim of showing logical compatibility.
- Distinguish moral from natural evil and describe how the defence treats each.
- Evaluate at least one objection to the free will defence.
- Explain Griffin's process theodicy and its rejection of classical omnipotence.
- Describe how process thought accounts for the origin of evil.
- Evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of process theodicy as a response to evil.
- Explain the free will defence, Hick's soul-making theodicy and Griffin's process theodicy accurately.
- Assess the strengths and weaknesses of each response against the problem it addresses.
- Reach and justify an overall judgement about the responses to evil and suffering.
Philosophy of religion: Evil and suffering exam tips
Marking Points
- Distinguishes the logical problem, which claims contradiction, from the evidential problem, which claims improbability.
- Defines moral evil as harm caused by free agents and natural evil as harm arising from natural processes.
- Explains that a theodicy attempts to justify God's permission of evil while a defence aims only to show no contradiction.
- Identifies the divine attributes at stake, namely omnipotence, omniscience and omnibenevolence.
- Recognises that the problem concerns both evil and the suffering it produces.
- Defines natural evil as suffering arising from impersonal natural processes such as earthquakes, disease or drought.
- Defines moral evil as suffering arising from deliberate or negligent human action such as murder or neglect.
- Classifies a given example correctly and justifies the classification with a stated criterion.
- Explains why the distinction matters for at least one defence or theodicy, such as the free will defence addressing moral evil directly.
- Recognises contested cases, such as famine worsened by human policy, and explains the difficulty of a sharp boundary.
- States the logical problem as a claim of inconsistency between any evil and an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent God.
- States the evidential problem as a claim that the amount or distribution of suffering makes such a God improbable rather than impossible.
- Identifies the deductive structure of the logical problem and the probabilistic structure of the evidential problem.
- Explains that a defence defeating the logical problem, such as the free will defence, need not answer the evidential problem.
- Uses the notion of apparently pointless or excessive suffering to explain the force of the evidential version.
- Distinguishes a defence, which shows a logical inconsistency is not proven, from a theodicy, which gives a positive justification for God permitting evil.
- Identifies the logical problem as a claimed contradiction between God's attributes and the existence of evil, and the evidential problem as an argument from the amount and distribution of suffering.
- Explains the Augustinian type response as locating evil in the misuse of free will and describing evil as a privation rather than a substance created by God.
- Explains the Irenaean type response as presenting evil and suffering as conditions for the development of moral and spiritual maturity.
- Assesses a response by asking whether it removes the contradiction and whether its costs, such as inherited guilt or a limited divine power, are acceptable.
- Applies a response to a concrete case of suffering and judges whether the explanation offered is proportionate to that case.
- Explains the world as a vale of soul-making in which persons develop moral and spiritual maturity rather than merely enjoy comfort.
- Explains the epistemic distance as God's non-obvious presence, which preserves human freedom and the possibility of uncoerced faith.
- Distinguishes the image of God, present from creation, from the likeness of God, which is developed through response to challenge.
- Illustrates the theodicy with virtues such as courage and compassion that require danger and suffering as their conditions.
- Assesses whether the scale and distribution of suffering are proportionate to soul-making, including suffering that destroys rather than develops a person.
- Evaluates the role of universal salvation in completing the theodicy and considers whether it is a strength or an unsupported assumption.
- Identifies the free will defence as an attempt to show that God and evil are logically compatible rather than to explain each particular evil.
- Explains that genuine freedom requires the real possibility of choosing moral evil, so a world with free creatures may contain moral evil.
- Distinguishes moral evil from natural evil and considers how the defence handles natural evil, for example through a stable world of natural law or free non-human agency.
- Evaluates a strength or weakness, such as whether the value of freedom justifies the extent of suffering or whether freedom is compatible with divine foreknowledge.
- Explains that Griffin's process theodicy denies classical omnipotence, presenting God's power as persuasive rather than coercive.
- Describes God as relational and involved in the world's becoming, sharing in suffering rather than standing outside it.
- Accounts for evil as arising from the freedom and spontaneity of entities within an evolving world that God cannot unilaterally control.
- Evaluates whether redefining divine power answers the problem of evil or weakens the concept of God.
- Explains the free will defence as the claim that significant freedom and its moral goods require the possibility of moral evil, then judges how far this accounts for natural as well as moral suffering.
- Outlines Hick's soul-making theodicy as the claim that the world is a vale of soul-making, and evaluates whether the extent and distribution of suffering are proportionate to that purpose.
- Presents Griffin's process theodicy as a response in which God persuades rather than coerces, and assesses whether this limits divine power in a way that answers the problem of evil.
- Weighs each response against the specific form of the problem it addresses, distinguishing the logical problem from the evidential problem where relevant.
- Reaches a supported overall judgement about which response is strongest and why, rather than merely listing strengths and weaknesses side by side.
Examiner Tips
- 💡Read the question stem carefully to see whether it targets the logical or evidential form.
- 💡Check each option against the definitions of moral and natural evil before choosing.
- 💡Eliminate options that misdescribe a theodicy as a defence, or the reverse.
- 💡Confirm that the chosen option addresses both evil and suffering where the stem requires it.
- 💡Open with one-sentence definitions of both terms before applying them to examples.
- 💡Name the criterion you use to classify an example, such as whether a human agent caused the suffering.
- 💡Use one borderline case to show evaluative depth rather than listing many examples.
- 💡Link the distinction explicitly to a named defence or theodicy to show why it is philosophically important.
- 💡Write the premises of each problem in numbered form before comparing them.
- 💡Use the word 'inconsistent' for the logical problem and 'improbable' for the evidential problem to keep the contrast sharp.
- 💡Refer to apparently pointless suffering when explaining the evidential problem's force.
- 💡Explain which responses target which problem rather than treating all responses as interchangeable.
- 💡Read the question stem for the words defence, theodicy or problem and let that wording decide which category your answer must use.
- 💡Name the form of the problem first, then the response, then the cost of the response, so the chain of reasoning is visible.
- 💡Use one short concrete example of suffering to test whether a response explains its scale and distribution, not just its existence.
- 💡Anchor the answer in Hick's own vocabulary, such as vale of soul-making and epistemic distance, and define each term as you use it.
- 💡Test the theodicy against a hard case of suffering that seems to defeat development, then weigh the response.
- 💡Treat universal salvation as a distinct component and judge separately whether it strengthens or weakens the argument.
- 💡State clearly whether the defence addresses the logical or the evidential problem of evil.
- 💡Use a concrete example, such as a moral choice to harm, to show how freedom permits evil.
- 💡Address at least one objection and respond to it to reach evaluative credit.
- 💡Link Griffin's view explicitly to Whitehead's process philosophy to show understanding.
- 💡Contrast persuasive and coercive power with a clear example.
- 💡Assess whether the redefinition of God's power is a strength or a weakness.
- 💡Anchor each response to the exact problem of evil it is meant to solve before judging it.
- 💡Use a concrete example of suffering to test each theodicy, then say whether the response handles it.
- 💡Reserve time to write an explicit evaluative conclusion that answers the question directly.
- 💡Keep to the three named responses; do not substitute other theodicies for them.
Common Mistakes
- Confuses the logical and evidential problems; keep contradiction distinct from improbability.
- Treats a defence as a full justification of God's ways; a defence only rebuts the claim of contradiction.
- Uses 'evil' and 'suffering' as interchangeable without noting that suffering names the experienced harm.
- Assumes all evil is moral; recognise natural evil arising from natural processes.
- Labels all suffering as moral evil; distinguish suffering caused by human agency from suffering caused by impersonal natural processes.
- Treats natural evil as automatically a greater problem than moral evil; explain the reasoning rather than assuming a ranking.
- Ignores borderline cases such as flooding worsened by poor land management; discuss how mixed causation complicates the classification.
- Defines the terms without examples; supply a concrete example for each category.
- Treats the two problems as identical; distinguish a claim of logical inconsistency from a claim of improbability.
- Assumes the evidential problem denies that God could exist; describe it as an argument about probability and evidence.
- Presents the free will defence as a complete answer to both problems; explain that it targets the logical version more directly.
- States the logical problem without its divine attributes; include omnipotence, omniscience and omnibenevolence explicitly.
- Treats every response as a theodicy; keep the defence and theodicy categories distinct and say which one a given response is.
- Assumes the logical and evidential problems are the same argument; separate the claimed contradiction from the argument based on the scale of suffering.
- Describes evil as a substance created by God within an Augustinian framework; state instead that evil is analysed as a privation of good.
- Offers a list of named thinkers without linking each to the problem it answers; connect each response to the specific form of the problem it addresses.
- Treats Hick's theodicy as a defence that merely removes a contradiction; present it instead as a theodicy offering a positive reason for God permitting evil.
- Confuses the image of God with the likeness of God; keep the two stages distinct and explain how the second is developed.
- Assumes the epistemic distance means God is absent; explain instead that God is present but not evident, so that faith remains free.
- Ignores the problem of dysteleological suffering; address suffering that appears to destroy rather than develop the sufferer.
- Treats the free will defence as a complete explanation of every specific instance of suffering; correct this by noting it is a defence showing logical compatibility.
- Confuses the free will defence with process theodicy; keep the two distinct by stressing that the free will defence retains divine omnipotence.
- Assumes freedom means the absence of any influence; clarify that the defence requires the genuine ability to choose between good and evil.
- Assumes process theodicy retains classical omnipotence; correct this by explaining that God's power is persuasive, not coercive.
- Presents Griffin's God as the direct author of evil; clarify that evil arises from the freedom of entities, not divine decree.
- Treats process theodicy as identical to the free will defence; distinguish them by noting the process rejection of classical omnipotence.
- Treats the free will defence as automatically covering natural suffering; explain that it must be argued to do so, since natural evil is not obviously the result of human choice.
- Describes Hick's theodicy as simply saying suffering is good; state instead that it claims suffering can be soul-making, and evaluate whether the evidence supports that.
- Presents Griffin's process theodicy as claiming God is all-powerful in the classical sense; explain that process thought limits divine power to persuasion.
- Lists strengths and weaknesses without reaching a judgement; draw the evaluation together into a reasoned conclusion.